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In this paper, we develop and explore the implications of an economic model that links the
incidence of terrorism in a country to the economic circumstances facing that country. We
brieﬂy sketch out a theory, in the spirit of Tornell (1998), that describes terrorist activities as
being initiated by groups that are unhappy with the current economic status quo, yet unable to
bring about drastic political and institutional changes that can improve their situation. Such
groups with limited access to opportunity may ﬁnd it rational to engage in terrorist activities.
The result is then a pattern of reduced economic activity and increased terrorism. In contrast,
an alternative environment can emerge where access to economic resources is more abundant
and terrorism is reduced. Our empirical results are consistent with the theory. We ﬁnd that
for democratic, high income countries, economic contractions (i.e. recessions) can provide the
spark for increased probabilities of terrorist activities.1 Introduction
The magnitude of the September 11th terrorism incident, whether measured in lives lost or economic
activity disrupted, was substantial. One study by the World Travel & Tourism Council estimated
the scale of the economic impact of the September 11 attacks to be in the tens of billions of dollars
globally, even without including the economic impact of job losses. Despite the unprecedented scale
of these attacks, it is important to keep in mind that terrorist attacks, albeit of a lower intensity,
have been widespread in the United States and in many other countries for the last 35 years. These
events, terrible as they are, serve as motivation for this research project. The goal of this project is
to understand the extent to which economic variables are important in inﬂuencing terrorism. Even
though we will never be able to fully explain the onset of an event like the attacks of September
11th, our study hopes to shed some new light on the links between economic developments and
terrorist activities.
This paper makes two central contributions: First, we outline a simple model that provides
some structure for thinking about the channels through which economic outcomes can inﬂuence
terrorist activities. Second, we examine empirically the presence of these channels by constructing
and employing a rich panel data set of 127 countries from 1968 to 1991. Our analysis investigates
the importance of standard economic variables such as GDP growth per capita and investment
in determining the onset and intensity of terrorist attacks. In doing so, we hope to provide a
systematic account of how economic developments inﬂuence terrorism. We believe the implication
of our research project is rather straight-forward: policy-makers should be aware of the extent to
which economics inﬂuences the likelihood of terrorist activities.
The theoretical foundations of our paper are based on the model of Tornell (1998). In
summary, a no-conﬂict status quo will eventually be disrupted by powerful groups who seek to in-
crease their appropriation and agenda setting power in the economy. Negative shocks that diminish
the growth of an economy’s resource base hasten the incidence of conﬂict. These predictions are
consistent with the empirical evidence in Hess and Orphanides (1995, 2001) and Blomberg and
Hess (2002), among others, that ﬁnds links between adverse economic outcomes and conﬂict. We
extend this work by breaking conﬂict down into two types: a “rebellion”, in which a group seek-
1ing to disrupt the status quo overthrows the government and takes over power, and a “terrorist
attack”, a less institutionally disruptive conﬂict type in which a dissident group seeks to indulge
in terrorist activities to increase their voice in the economy, yet are unable to take over power.
The basic prediction of the model is that the choice between a “rebellion attack” and a “terrorist
attack” is inﬂuenced by the country’s ability to not give in to the dissident groups. In particular,
during bad economic times, economies with well-established institutions and defense capabilities
are more likely to be aﬀected by terrorism, whereas economies with weak institutions and defense
capabilities are more likely to see civil wars, coups and other conﬂict types designed to overthrow
the government.
While our theory provides some structure for the links between economic weakness and
terrorism, we also examine the empirical linkages between the two. We construct a data set of
economic and terrorism variables by linking the Summers and Heston (1995) data set to the IT-
ERATE data set. The empirical work estimates and identiﬁes the separate channels by which
the economy and terrorism aﬀect each other. We ﬁnd that for democratic, high income countries
economic contractions (i.e. recessions) can provide the spark for increased probabilities of terrorist
activities, which in turn raise the probability of recessions in a “trap-like” environment.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 of the paper discusses the relevant
literature and establishes the context for our paper. Section 3 presents the basic theory and its
implications. Section 4 provides a description of the data, and preliminary analysis. Section 5
provides the results from our empirical model and we conclude with Section 6.
2 Literature Summary
In summarizing an entire journal issue devoted to the topic of economics and conﬂict, Sandler
(2000) points out that “economists have increasingly turned their attention to the study of conﬂict
and its resolution in the past four decades.” Accordingly, we ﬁrst review the seminal research into
the determinants of terrorism. Work by Grossman (1991) presents a general equilibrium model that
treats insurrection and the suppression of insurrection as economic activities willingly undertaken
2by the participants. The ruler has to trade oﬀ higher taxes not only with the lower tax revenue that
comes about when people devote less time to productive activities but also with the added cost of
having to hire soldiering services to suppress insurrection. Grossman ﬁnds that economies in which
the soldiering technology is eﬀective can move themselves to no-conﬂict equilibria by devoting some
resources to soldiering and keeping tax rates low. Lapan and Sandler (1993) presents an analysis of
terrorism as a signaling game in the face of incomplete information. Terrorist attacks are devices
through which the two sides learn more about each others oﬀensive and defensive capabilities.
Lapan and Sandler (1988) examine the extent to which governments should pre-commit themselves
to a strategy of never negotiating with terrorists. They show that such a strategy is not likely to
work when terrorists have a high probability of success or when the cost of failure is low. Eﬀective
deterrence would then require taking steps to reduce the probability of success and to raise the cost
of failure in addition to adopting otherwise time inconsistent strategies of non-negotiation.
On the empirical side, Enders, Sandler and Cauley (1990) have developed a model to assess
the eﬀectiveness of terrorist-thwarting policies on terrorism. Unfortunately, they ﬁnd little evidence
for legislative activity in preventing terrorism. They ﬁnd that installing metal detectors in airports
helped reduce the incidence of skyjackings while enhancing security in embassies helped increase
the safety of U.S. diplomats albeit with the unintended consequence of decreasing the safety of non-
diplomatic individuals. Atkinson, Sandler and Tschirhart (1987) examine the impact of changes in
the negotiating environment (e.g. bargaining costs, bluﬃng) on the length and severity of terrorist
attacks. They ﬁnd, in general, that increases in bargaining costs lengthen the duration of a terrorist
incident. O’Brien (1996) looks at whether terrorism is used as a foreign policy tool by international
superpowers: he shows that authoritarian regimes are more likely to sponsor terrorist attacks
following setbacks in the foreign policy arena. Finally, work by Enders, Sandler and Parise (1992)
examine the impact of terrorism on the economy. Using an ARIMA model, the authors estimate
that there are large and substantial losses to the tourism industry caused by terrorist incidents.
These papers provide, broadly speaking, the groundwork for analyzing terrorism within an
economic framework. They do not, however, explicitly address how, or even whether, the onset of
terrorist incidence is related to the economic situation of a country. There is, however, an existing
literature that analyzes how economics inﬂuences conﬂict in general. However, most of the analysis
3to this point has considered the impact on conﬂicts such as war without considering alternative
types of conﬂict such as terrorism. For example, Hess and Orphanides (1995, 2001) estimate the
probability of conﬂict for the U.S. doubles when the economy has recently been in an economic
contraction and the president is running for reelection. Similarly, Stoll (1984), Ostrom and Job
(1986), Russett (1990), Lian and O’Neal (1993), DeRouen (1995), Wang (1996) Gelpi (1997), and
Brueck (2002) have found important linkages between the incidence of war and the political cycle
and/or the business cycle.
Broader deﬁnitions of conﬂict have been considered in more recent research. In their anal-
ysis, Blomberg, Hess and Thacker (2002), and Blomberg and Hess (2002) provide more speciﬁc
deﬁnitions of conﬂict such as external conﬂict (e.g. wars) and internal conﬂict (e.g. coups). After
doing so, however, rather than ﬁnding a systematic relationship across all countries and time, they
found a conditional conﬂict-growth relationship, that can only be identiﬁed once the region and
initial conditions are taken into account. While the above research provides a foundation for the
determinants of terrorism, it still does not address the question our paper raises–does the economy
help inﬂuence the initiation of terrorist activities in a systematic way? And if so, what is the
theoretical justiﬁcation for it? The model and the analysis in the next two section seek to address
these questions.
3 The Theory
In this section, we sketch out a theory of the links between economic variables and terrorist attacks.
We construct a model that combines features of the static model of Grossman (1991) and the
dynamic model of Tornell (1998). Prior to presenting our model, it is important to keep in mind
our paper’s objectives. First, we use the simple model to provide important theoretical structure
for linking economic activity and terrorism. The model describes not just the links between the
economy and conﬂict, but also the links between the economy and the type of conﬂict, whether
a civil war or a terrorist attack. Second, other models could yield predictions similar to those
from our approach: hence, the empirical results are by no means proof of the superiority of this
model over others. Instead, we simply use this model to provide some structure and intuition for
4the empirical results. Finally, this model (and our empirical results) focus only on the economic
explanations for terrorist activities. By no means do we imply that economic explanations underlie
all terrorist activity, or that better economic times will prevent any particular terrorist act from
taking place.
The theory we use draws on the work of Grossman (1991)and Tornell (1998). Grossman’s
model describes insurrections and the suppression of insurrections as being related to the technology
of soldiering and rebellion, to the production technology as well as to the amount of resources being
extracted by the rulers in the form of taxes. Tornell’s model describes the behavior of organized
groups that extract rents from the economy, eventually depleting the resources to a point where
one group decides to abandon this status quo in an attempt to consolidate their power and deprive
the other group of their power. Although Tornell’s model is used to analyze the question of why
economic reforms come from within, the framework is general enough to be used for addressing
economic explanations for global terrorism.
The basic structure of the model is as follows: There are two organized groups in the
economy: a government and dissidents.1 Both groups appropriate the stock of resources in the
economy at, which has a raw growth rate of β. The government appropriates resources at a rate γ
whereas the dissident group extracts resources from the economy at a lesser rate δ, i.e. δ < γ. The
evolution of assets in the economy is, described by the equation
˙ at = β ∗ at − γ ∗ at − δ ∗ at.
The dissident group has three options. First, it can choose to attack the government and seek
to overthrow it. If it is successful in this endeavor, then the dissident group gets a share of the
productive resource base in the economy and also gets to restructure the economy and set the new
rules for the economy. To be more speciﬁc, at time τ, the dissident group can mount a “rebellion
attack” that lasts h periods, expending a fraction qR ∈ (0,1) of its appropriation in the process. If
it succeeds, with probability θ, it takes over the role of the government and gets to extract a larger
1Just as Tornell categorizes potentially heterogeneous sub-groups under the broad rubric of “unions” or “corpo-
rations”, the rubric of “dissidents” can cover many groups with diﬀerent objectives and ideologies.
5fraction of resources, γ instead of δ.2 It also gets future control over setting the rules in the new
economy. We denote the present value of income gained by setting these new rules by the term W.
The second option for the dissident group is to mount a low intensity attack on the gov-
ernment in the form of a “terrorist attack”. These are not as intense as an overthrowing of the
government but are instead designed to signal unhappiness with the status quo and to increase their
control over the economy. To be more speciﬁc, at time τ, the dissident group can mount a “terrorist
attack” that lasts h periods, expending a fraction qT ∈ (0,1) of its appropriation in the process,
where qT < qR. To be concrete, we deﬁne qT = (qR)α , where 0 < α < 1. The parameter α is a
key parameter in our model. It captures the eﬃciency of the dissidents’ technology. As dissidents
become more capable in terrorist acts, α → 1. The diﬀerence between a “terrorist” attack and a
“rebellion attack” is that the if the former succeeds it does not get more control of the ﬁscal assets
in the economy, but it does get more agenda setting power over the rules of the economy3: we
denote the present value of income gained by partially setting these new rules as αW. Note that
we link the institutional terrorist technology to the payoﬀ as well. In this way, when α → 1, the
net beneﬁts for terrorism rise relative to war due to some institutional technology factor.
The ﬁnal option for the dissident group is, of course, to maintain the status quo. They will
only choose to maintain the status quo if the cost of mounting either a terrorist attack or a rebellion
attack is too high relative to the reward of doing so.4
We can now compare the payoﬀ functions under the three options. If we assume a subjective












Equation (1) divides the payoﬀ into three main time parts: the past periods before consid-
2While some readers may view θ as increasing in q, such an amendment to the model only strengthens our ﬁndings.
3Note that we are implicitly assuming that the probability of success in a terrorist attack is the same as the
probability of success in overthrowing the government. Such a simpliﬁcation does not meaningfully aﬀect the results
presented below.
4Note that, the government, while not being modeled explicitly, is not completely passive. The rate at which they
choose to extract resources γ, the policies that it chooses to aﬀect the growth of the economy, and the resources that
they devote to soldiering all aﬀect the resources that the dissident group has to expend in order to mount a successful
attack.
6ering attack t ∈ [0,τ), the possible insurrection period, t ∈ [τ,τ + h), and the remaining periods,
t ∈ [τ + h,∞). As S(τ) is the status quo, the values in the integrals are the same in each period,
so that S(τ) =
R ∞
0 δa0e(β−γ−δ)se−ρsds.
We next turn our attention to the payoﬀ for the rebellion option. The payoﬀ to the dissident
group from launching an attack suﬃcient to overthrow the status quo diﬀers from the above because
of two factors: the cost the group has to pay during the τ to h period long insurrection and the
beneﬁts that it gets if the insurrection is successful, consisting of greater extraction of the asset
stock and the ability to set the new rules for the economy. For simplicity, we assume that an
unsuccessful insurrection does not result in any governmental retribution (so that you get to go














γa0e(β−γ−δ)se−ρsds + θWe−ρ(τ+h)]) (2)
While the ﬁrst terms in equations (1) and (2) are the same, the remaining terms show the
diﬀerences described in the preceding paragraph. Note that as the probability of success approaches
zero without expending any cost qR, equation (2) reduces to (1).
Finally, we describe the payoﬀ to the dissident group from launching a terrorist attack, i.e.
an attack that is not of suﬃcient scale to overthrow the status quo but large enough to potentially
increase the dissident group’s agenda setting power. The primary diﬀerence in the terrorist case
versus the rebellion case is that it costs less qT < qR and the extraction rate over the period from
τ + h to ∞ remains at δ instead of γ; with the group only receiving partial beneﬁt from changing











δa0e(β−γ−δ)se−ρsds + θαWe−ρ(τ+h)] (3)
5This could be amended without any loss of generality. However, to keep things simple, we choose not to include
such an extension.
7Having described each payoﬀ separately, we now compare them directly so that we can
examine the conditions that lead to rebellion and terrorism over status quo responses. For exposi-
tional purposes, we begin by comparing Terrorism to the Status Quo, T and S, and then compare
Rebellion to the Status Quo, R and S. Finally, we compare R to T. In other words, we examine
the conditions under which some attack is warranted. After that, we examine which sort of attack
is warranted, R or T.
Mathematically, the diﬀerence between the payoﬀ from terrorism and the status quo is given
by
T(τ) − S(τ) = −qT
Z τ+h
τ
δa0e(β−γ−δ)se−ρsds + θWe−ρ(τ+h). (4)
Notice that the status quo diﬀers from the terrorist outcome in two signiﬁcant ways: ﬁrst a
terrorist attack carries a cost of qT of foregone extraction during the attack period, and second, the
terrorist attack, if successful, allows the group a greater ability to change the rules of the economy.
The sign of equation (4) is therefore ambiguous. It also follows that the diﬀerence between the








From this equation, we see that the payoﬀ between R and S leads to an equation that cannot be
arbitrarily signed either, indicating that at a given point in time there is no reason for rebellion to
be preferred to the status quo.
However, even if initially the status quo yields a more favorable outcome than either a
rebellion or a terrorist attack, since the beneﬁt from either attack (W) is ﬁxed, while the costs
(a portion of the extraction from a dwindling stock of assets) are decreasing over time, the payoﬀ
to attack will become higher than the payoﬀ to pursuing the status quo at some point in the
(perhaps distant) future.6 The question then becomes, what type of attack will be undertaken by
6While we have concentrated our discussion on cases in which some type of insurrection is inevitable, there
are obvious cases under which the status quo may be preferred, since the cost of any type of insurrection may be
prohibitive resulting in the payoﬀ from the status quo being higher than either option. This will occur when q
T or
q
R are prohibitively large, or when the growth rates are suﬃciently large. Since these issues are tangential to the
present paper, we have not studied this issue in more detail in this paper.
8the dissident group?
To answer this question, we examine the diﬀerence between the payoﬀ from launching a
rebellion and the payoﬀ from terrorism:








+(1 − α)θWe−ρ(τ+h) (6)
Since the resources expended for terrorism are less than the resources expended for rebellion,
(qT − qR) < 0, there is the possibility that the additional resources expended for a successful
rebellion are much smaller than the additional payoﬀ that a rebellion brings. Hence, when there
is some sort of attack, terrorism is preferred over rebellion, when payoﬀs for rebellions are smaller
and costs for rebellions are greater. Intuitively, we would expect these costs to be higher given
higher economic growth (high β), lower extraction by the government(low γ) and higher extraction
by the dissidents (high δ).
To formalize this, consider Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Lower economic growth (low β) and higher shares to the government (high γ)
increase the likelihood of a rebellion or terrorist attack.





∂γ > 0. The equation for the rebellion payoﬀ leads to the same result provided the two
parties are extracting resources at a rate that exceeds the raw growth rate β. If so, then
∂(R−S)
∂β < 0.
Notice, it is only under very stringent conditions that conﬂict will never occur. In general,
as the resources in the economy dwindle, conﬂict becomes a more attractive option for the dissident
groups. Since the resources of the economy depend on how high the tax rates are, and on how low
the extraction rates are, we would expect that economies with low growth rates, high government
tax rates and higher political unrest(disgruntlement of dissident groups with their extraction rate)
9would have higher incidences of conﬂict. So, during poor economic times (low β), and when the
relative share of the pie is smaller (high γ), dissidents will attack by some means.
To investigate which mode of conﬂict will be chosen, we consider the equilibrium where
attack is ﬁrst chosen over the status quo and within the attack types, terrorism is chosen over
rebellion. Using equation (6), we see that the payoﬀ to using terrorism as a mode of conﬂict instead
of rebellion will be high, when the cost diﬀerential in initiating rebellion (qR−qT) is high. Intuitively,
one would expect that the diﬀerence between the resources needed to initiate a rebellion and the
resources needed to initiate a terrorist attack depend on the institutional processes of the economy
(which can include a variety of factors including GDP per capita, income distribution, military
spending, ethnic divisions etc.) We can specify these costs as working through α. Furthermore, the
beneﬁts to using terrorism as opposed to rebellion also depend positively on α, which is the degree
to which the dissident group can set the agenda using terrorist attacks.7
To see this formally, we consider the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Institutional processes that favor terrorist activities (high α) increase the probabil-
ity of a terrorist attack over a rebellion.
To see this, we repeat the analogous experiment from Proposition 1. From equation (6),
∂R−T
∂α < 0
So what do Proposition’s 1 and 2 imply? Conﬂict is likely to occur when the economy
is failing (e.g. β falls) and when dissident groups receive smaller portions of the pie. However,
the key to whether the group chooses to rebel or commit a terrorist act depends crucially on their
access to the government α. When groups have fewer channels to construct an organized uprising
(high α), they must resort to terrorist acts during poor economic times. However, if they can
organize, it might be more beneﬁcial for them to initiate a civil war. This would be in line with
the empirical results in Blomberg and Hess (2002) that show a strong correlation between adverse
economic outcomes and the prevalence of civil war. However, the present paper is more concerned
7Other factors that may inﬂuence α such as the government’s willingness to accede to terrorist demand, the degree
of sympathy from inside the government etc. can inﬂuence the terrorist’s ability to change the rules of the economy
to its liking.
10with the conditions under which terrorism will be chosen over war. In the subsequent section, we
will explore this implication of our model to see if in fact terrorism is chosen by those countries
with high α during bad economic times.
In summary, we have constructed a simple theory that predicts conﬂict to be more likely
in bad times: when the resource base of the economy shrinks, dissident groups are less likely to be
satisﬁed with claiming their low share of the smaller pie and are likely to instigate some type of
conﬂict to increase their share of the pie. Furthermore, the theory predicts that the choice between
a rebellion, in which the dissidents overthrow the government, and a terrorist attack, in which the
dissidents seek to improve their voice in the economy, depend on the degree to which the government
is responsive to the terrorists demands and on the soldiering technology of the economy. Richer
countries that have better institutions, stronger economies and well-equipped armies raise the cost
of rebellion to the point that dissident groups prefer to resort to terrorism.
4 Data and Preliminary Analysis
In this section, we describe the data employed in the paper and then examine and present its
empirical regularities. The data were obtained from two diﬀerent sources. To measure terrorist
activities, we employ the ITERATE data set from Mickolus et al (1995). The economic data are
obtained from the update to the Summers and Heston (1991) data set.
We begin by describing the ITERATE data set. The ITERATE project began as an attempt
to quantify characteristics, activities and impacts of transnational terrorist groups. The data set
is grouped into four categories. First, there are incident characteristics which code the timing of
each event. Second, the terrorist characteristics yield information about the number, makeup and
groups involved in the incidents. Third, victim characteristics describe analogous information on
the victims involved in the attacks. Finally, life and property losses attempt to quantify the damage
of the attack. The empirical work below focuses on the incidence of terrorist events, though other
qualitative features of the data are also discussed.
In order to be considered an international/transnational terrorist event, the deﬁnition in
11ITERATE is as follows: “the use, or threat of use, of anxiety-inducing, extra-normal violence for
political purposes by any individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established
governmental authority, when such action is intended to inﬂuence the attitudes and behavior of a
target group wider than the immediate victims and when, through the nationality or foreign ties
of its perpetrators, its location, the nature of its institutional or human victims, or the mechanics
of its resolution, its ramiﬁcations transcend national boundaries.”
The economic data are from the Summers and Heston data set. We calculated log per-capita
annual growth rates of the data for most countries from 1968 to 1991. The remaining data employed
are given in a straight forward manner deﬁned by Summers and Heston. The main advantage of
employing the Summers and Heston data set is that it is calculated in PPP adjusted exchange rates
so cross-country comparisons can be made with better adjustments due to price diﬀerences.
In all, there are 159 countries over 24 years providing 3816 observations in the ITERATE
data set. The Summers and Heston data set is given for 152 countries over 25 years providing 3800
observations. When we combine them, we are left with 127 countries over the years 1968 to 1991
giving us a rich panel of 3014 observations.
To get a snapshot of what is revealed by the data, we begin by examining the incidence of
terrorism. Figure 1 is a map of the world which includes all of the countries in our sample from
1968-1991. Each country has a graduated blue color with the darkest representing the countries
with the most terrorist events and the lightest representing the countries with the least. The areas
of the world that appear to be those with the most terrorism are the Americas and Europe whereas
there appears to be far less terrorism in Africa.
If we compared these results to the economy, we would see a striking similarity. Figure 2 is
an analogous map of the world however color now represents real GDP per capita. Obviously the
richest areas such as North America and Europe are still very blue, whereas Africa is the opposite.8
How do we interpret this in the context of our model? The above “mapping” of terrorism
to the economy is obviously too simplistic. It is unlikely that only the wealthy engage in terrorist
8This is further seen in our three dimensional map in Figure 3 in which color is denoted by terrorism and height
is denoted by GDP per capita.
12activities whereas the poor do not. There must be some other factor at work here.
The model presented in the previous section provides an explanation for this data snapshot.
We showed that the decision to engage in “terrorism from within” is driven by two key factors–an
institutional one and an economic one. We begin by describing the institutional factor that helps
explain Figure 1.
Our model derives an equilibrium in which groups that do not have direct access to the
elites send their message by committing terrorist activities since they do not have a voice in the
political process. Since the democracies of Europe and North America are largely driven by major
parties, fringe groups tend to get far less representation in the legislatures. In these cases, our
model predicts there would be more terrorism. In the non-democratic states in Africa, there is no
direct or even indirect access to the government. In this case, in order to get action, they must
develop a uniﬁed resistance and resort to actual war with the opposing government to make change.
In fact, Blomberg and Hess (2002) showed that there is indeed much more civil war in Africa vs.
the North America and Europe. These institutional diﬀerences would help explain Figure 1.
Next, we explain the economic factor that relates Figure 1 to Figure 2. Our model showed
that if there is a suﬃcient pie to ﬁght over (high GDP per capita), then in bad times the fringe
groups will resort to violence to get change. The size of the economic pie is indeed greatest in
North America and Europe as seen in Figure 2. However, Figure 2 also shows that the size of the
economic pie is rather small in Africa. So even if their institutional structure were diﬀerent they
might be less likely to commit a terrorist oﬀense given the lack of economic change that is possible.
To see this in practice, we present a case study from two of the rich countries in each of
the geographical locations–one from North America and one from Europe. First, we consider the
United States. By some measures the U.S. is the richest country in the world. Interestingly enough,
we ﬁnd it is clearly the country with the most terrorist incidents as well. During the period 1968-
1991, there was an average of 28 terrorist attacks per year.9 Table 2A provides a breakdown of
which groups engaged in terrorist activities over the time sample. We break the time sample into
three equal periods. Notice that one of the main perpetrators, in the ﬁrst two periods but not in the
9See Table 1 for a complete list of countries and average annual terrorist attacks.
13third is the FALN (Armed Front for National Liberation), a group lobbying for the separation of
Puerto Rico from the United States. Furthermore, unknown groups remain quite active throughout
the sample. This highlights one of the main points in our theoretical analysis. Terrorist attacks are
predominantly instigated by fringe organizations that would not ordinarily get their agenda heard
in the legislature.
Next, we consider France which is the European country with the most terrorism. Table 2B
is constructed analogously to Table 2A. It is interesting to note how similar they are. Once again,
unknown is the main source for terrorist attacks so an economic model might again aid in explaining
the incidence of terrorism. Furthermore, of the main identiﬁable groups, the predominant entity
is the Corsican National Liberation Front, a fringe group whose motives and role is comparable to
the FALN within the United States. This points to an institutional structure - broadly consistent
with the theory presented in the previous section - that facilitates terrorism by fringe groups that
are potentially unhappy with the status quo, yet lacking in the support or resources necessary for
bringing about broad based institutional change that conforms more to their preferred world view.
Interestingly, more terrorism also tends to take place during the earlier time periods rather
than in the later time period. Our model would also have an explanation for this phenomenon.
Our model predicts that in bad economic times there is more impetus for terrorism. Clearly the
number and severity of economic contractions are much larger during the 1968-84 period rather
than the 1985-1991 period.
While these maps and tables are thought provoking and provide some indirect support
for our theory, they are not a formal test. To explore the model’s predictions systematically, we
consider a more formal structure. In what follows, we describe our formal empirical model.
5 Methodology and Empirical Results
In this section, we analyze the dynamics of economic activity and terrorism. In particular, we
analyze these patterns over several relevant sub-samples. Following Burns and Mitchell (1944), we
measure short run economic activity as discrete regimes, namely, contractions and expansions. The
14former are periods where economic activity as measured by the growth of real GDP growth per-
capita are negative, whereas for the latter they are non-negative. Similarly, terrorism is deﬁned if a
country has any terrorist incidents in a given year. Alternatively, peace is a period of no terrorism.
5.1 Simple Empirical Regularities
In this subsection, we formalize the empirical relationship between growth and terrorism by ﬁrst
examining the univariate dynamics of each. We do this so that we can establish some simple
empirical facts about terrorism and contractions as well as provide an introduction to Markov
Processes.
Markov processes are dynamic processes which capture the observed transitions from one
state at time period t−1, to either remain in that state at time period t or to switch to another state
at time period t. This has the natural interpretation for business cycles as the economy is in either
one of two states: economic contraction or expansion. For purposes of our analysis, we deﬁne a
recession in to be a period of negative per-capita growth of real GDP during and an expansion as a
period of non-negative growth. As these are mutually exclusive, we deﬁne a contraction (expansion)
in period t − 1 as Ct−1 (Et−1). The speciﬁcation of a Markov process is an attempt to specify the
extent to which a particular state of the economy in a previous period aﬀects the probability of an
expansion or contraction in the current period.10
With this generalization as background, we deﬁne pij as the conditional probability that
the economy is in state i = C,E in period t − 1 and in the state j = C,E in period t. The 2 × 2

















where PR will denote probability. One attractive feature of this formulation is that and each row
10This speciﬁcation of a ﬁrst order Markov process follows Blomberg and Hess (2002). Higher order Markov
processes can be speciﬁed by allowing the economy’s state in period t − 1 and earlier to independently aﬀect the
economy’s state in period t. For the purposes of this study, however, we maintain a ﬁrst order structure on our
analysis as higher order Markov processes dramatically increases the number of parameters to be estimated and
reduce the precision of these estimates.
15of the transition matrix sums to one. So this 2 × 2 Markov transition matrix only requires us to
estimate two parameters as pCE = 1.0 − pCC and pEC = 1.0 − pEE. The log-likelihood function,
ln(L) for the 2 × 2 Markov process is:11
Ln(L) = nCCln(pCC) + nCEln(1 − pCC) + nECln(1 − pEE) + nEEln(pEE) (8)
where nij be the number of occurrences of state i in period t − 1 and in state j in period t. It
is straightforward to show that the maximum likelihood estimators of the probabilities are simply
ˆ pCC = nCC/nC and ˆ pEE = nEE/nE, where nj is the number of observations in state j at time t-1.
In other words, pij is the observed fraction of times that state j was observed at time t when state
i was observed at time t − 1 .
Table 3 reports the results from our estimation of these transitional probabilities. The
ﬁrst column of results reports the estimates for the economy whereas the second column reports
the analogous exercise for terrorism. Each panel of the Table reports the results for 13 samples of
countries. The samples are for the entire data set (ALL), and those based on initial income: namely,
the country’s whose initial real GDP per-capita in 1967 was below the median (LOW INCOME),
and those that were above the median (HIGH INCOME). Finally we separately examine fully
democratic countries (DEMOCRACIES), non-fully democratic countries (NON-DEMOCRACIES),
African countries (AFRICA) and non-African countries (NON-AFRICA), and Democratic and High
Income Countries (High Income & Democratic).
The ﬁrst row of the panel reports the transitional probability of remaining in a contraction
this period, given that you were in a contraction last period, pCC = PR(Ct|Ct−1). The second row
of the panel reports the expected duration associated with that probability which is calculated as
DUR(C|Ct−1) = 1/(1 − pCC). Rows three and four present the analogous transition probability
and duration of an expansion. The ﬁfth row of the table reports the long run, steady-state fraction
of time that the economy is in a contraction, PR(C) = (1 − pEE)/(2 − pCC − pEE). Finally, the
sixth row report the p-value for the test of the null hypothesis that the sub-sample states of nature
were generated from the full-sample probabilities .12
11We ignore terms that are not functions of the probabilities pij.
12More speciﬁcally, one evaluates log-likelihood for the sub-sample using the maximum likelihood estimates obtained
16The results are quite intriguing. In the ﬁrst column of the top panel, we show that, the
probability of remaining in a contraction another year (pCC) is about .45 for the full sample, and
hence the probability of switching to an expansion phase is .55 (.55 = 1.0 − .45). This number
may seem rather high when considering industrialized business cycles. However, given that much
of the sample is taken from developing countries, the estimate is not as surprising. The probability
of remaining in an expansion another year is about .77, which implies that the corresponding
probability that the expansions will switch to a contraction next year is .23 (.23 = 1.0 − .77).
These transitional probabilities translate into an expected duration of contractions of just under 2
years and just over 4 years for expansions. The top panel of the table also reports that there is a
contraction (i.e. negative growth) in about one-in-three years in the sample.
The remaining panels of the ﬁrst column of Table 3 present the estimation results of the
Markov process for several important sub-samples of the data. There are three noteworthy, as
well as statistically signiﬁcant, diﬀerences in the univariate results for economic contractions and
expansions when we consider sub-groups. First, countries with higher income at the beginning of
the sample have longer, more persistent expansions. More speciﬁcally, the duration of expansions,
conditional on being in a state of expansion, is only three years for low income countries but almost
six years for high income countries. However, the duration of contractions is not aﬀected by a
country’s income status. Second, Africa, has both more contractions and shorter expansions as
compared to non-African countries, and these diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant at below the
conventional .10 levels as reported in the p-value row. Indeed, the expected duration of expansions
is about 2.5 years, while it is over 5 years for non-African countries and over 6 years for high income,
democratic countries. African countries are in the state of economic contraction about 43 percent
of the time, as compared to only 26 percent of the time for non African countries. These ﬁndings
are, no doubt, due to the widespread lack of economic growth over the past several decades in
Africa. Finally, democratic countries tend to have fewer and shorter contractions and longer and
more frequent expansions than non-democratic countries.
Similarly, using the methodology discussed above, we can also estimate the transitional
from the sub-sample and the full sample and then constructs a likelihood ratio test between the two. The p-value is
obtained from a χ
2 distribution with two degrees of freedom, stemming from the two estimated transition parameters.
17patterns between Terrorism and Peace. The estimation results from these Markov processes are
reported in the second column of results of Table 3. For the full sample, as shown in the top
panel, these ﬁndings bear the unfortunate news that Terrorism is not a rare and unusual event, as
it accounts for approximately 46 percent of the sample. Moreover, once one enters into a period
of terrorism, the conditional expected duration spell of terrorism is just under 4 years, and its
conditional probability of continuing an additional year is 74 percent.
The sub-samples of the data for the Terrorism data also reveal a number of important
empirical features. First, countries with higher income at the beginning of the sample have more
persistent episodes of terrorism, that are more durable and more frequent. Indeed, high income
countries have terrorist events in about sixty percent of their sample, as compared to low income
countries that have terrorist events in about thirty percent of their sample. Also, the conditional
duration of terrorism continuing given that it has started is over .8 for high income countries, though
only .6 for low income countries. Second, democracies appear to be more aﬀected by terrorism than
non-democracies: terrorism is more prevalent, durable and persistent in democracies as compared
to non-democracies. Third, Africa, has about one-third as many years with terrorist events as non-
African countries: slightly more than 60 percent of the non-African sample has a year coded with
a terrorist incident, whereas slightly less than 20 percent of the African sample has a year coded
with a terrorist incident. As well, the conditional persistence of terrorist events is much lower in
African (about probability .5) as compared to non-African countries (about probability .8), while
the conditional persistence of peace is much higher in Africa (about probability .9) as compared to
non-African countries (about probability .65).
These preliminary ﬁndings suggest that for most countries, prosperity and terrorism are the
norm. Moreover, while economic contractions and periods free from terrorist events do occur, the
former occurs less frequently for high income and democratic countries, while the latter occurs more
frequently for richer countries. As an important caveat, however, Todd Sandler made the important
comment to us that a possible explanation for why high income and democratic countries have more
terrorism is that they simply have fewer press restrictions: hence, they may appear to have more
terrorism simply because their news agencies may be more likely to report it. While the ﬁndings in
this sub-section may be aﬀected by this criticism, those in the following sub-section would not be.
18Indeed, in the following sub-section, we demonstrate that the propensity for terrorism is aﬀected by
the business cycle for democratic and high income countries. Such a ﬁnding of a cyclical economic
predecessor to terrorism would not be a direct by-product of sample selection issues driven by
countries that have a free press.
5.2 Identifying the Transitions Into Terrorism and Economic Contractions
In this subsection, we extend the empirical model presented above so that we may investigate the
joint determination of terrorism and contractions. The methodology employed in this section is
similar to that used in the previous section and in Blomberg and Hess (2002). Consider the joint
determination of terrorism, Tt, and contraction, Ct. To keep the accounting straight, denote state 1
as the joint occurrence of internal conﬂict and contraction, Tt & Ct, state 2 as the joint occurrence
of internal conﬂict and expansion, Tt & Et, state 3 as the joint occurrence of internal peace and
contraction Pt & Ct, and state 4 as the joint occurrence of internal peace and expansion Pt & Et. As
before, we can then estimate the transition matrix of probabilities, but now there are 4 possibilities
such that pij for i,j = 1,4 speciﬁes the transitions from state i in period t − 1 to state j in period
t.
Table 4 provides the estimation results of this bivariate Markov process. The tables are
organized in a similar fashion to Table 3. Not only are we interested in estimating the parameters
from these Markov processes, however, but more importantly we are interested in using these esti-
mated transition probabilities from the Markov matrix to help to identify ‘causal’ timing patterns
in the data. To keep our reporting of the estimates parsimonious, we restrict our presentation to
key statistics such as testing whether PR(Tt|Pt−1&Ct−1) = PR(Tt|Pt−1&Et−1).13 The estimates
and the restriction are reported in the top panel of the table. The restriction on the likelihood
function can be implemented, and the restrictions can be tested using a χ2 likelihood ratio test
with one degree of freedom. The reported p-value is presented in Table 4 and is labeled in the
row immediately following the estimated transition probabilities. In this way, we wish to infer
that economic contractions cause an increase in the transition from internal peace to terrorism
13This requires estimating the parameters of the log-likelihood function subject to the additional constraint that
p31 + p32 = p41 + p42.
19since it is temporally prior to the incident. Of course, terrorism may be more persistent when
coupled with a contraction than otherwise. This, of course, can be explored by examining whether
PR(Tt|Tt−1&Ct−1) = PR(Tt|Tt−1&Et−1), and testing whether the two are equal. This is done in
the second panel of the table.
As well, we also test for whether the pattern of contractions is aﬀected by terrorism. For
example, we examine whether the transition probability from expansion to contraction rises if a
conﬂict is present, by testing the null hypothesis that PR(Ct|Tt−1&Et−1) = PR(Ct|Pt−1&Et−1),
against the alternative that these parameters should be freely estimated – see third panel.14 Finally,
we test for whether the conditional persistence of economic contractions is aﬀected by the presence
of terrorism in the fourth panel – PR(Ct|Tt−1&Ct−1) = PR(Ct|Ct−1&Et−1)
Not surprisingly, the results in Table 4 point to a broad dependence between terrorist
incidents and economic contractions, though not for all countries. Indeed, for the full data sample
(column 1 of results), the estimated conditional probability of terrorism is not signiﬁcantly aﬀected
by whether a contraction occurred in the most recent year or not at the .10 level. Similarly, the
likelihood of a contraction is not aﬀected by terrorism. For example, for the full data sample, the
conditional probability of a terrorist activity next period given that a country is currently at peace
is .196 if the economy is also expanding, while it is .197 if the economy is contracting: namely,
PR(Tt|Pt−1&Et−1) and PR(Tt|Pt−1&Ct−1) are essentially identical.
However, for a number of important sub-groups listed at the top of the table, there is strong
dependence between terrorism and economic activity. There are three noteworthy points centering
on how income and governance account for this dependence. First, the relationship between terror-
ism and the economy appears to be quite important for High Income countries, though not for Low
Income countries. For example, the conditional persistence of terrorist events is signiﬁcantly higher
when an economic contraction has occurred (.782) as compared to when an economic expansion
has occurred (.718). Moreover, a contraction is more likely to start after a terrorist episode has
taken place as compared to when a terrorist episode has not taken place.15. Both of these ﬁnd-
ings, however, do not hold for low income countries. Second, the relationships between terrorism
14This again requires estimating the parameters of the log-likelihood function subject to the additional constraint
that p22 + p24 = p42 + p44.
15PR(Ct|Pt−1&Et−1) = .146 < .188 = PR(Ct|Tt−1&Et−1) with a p-value of .026.
20and the economy are quite diﬀerent for Democratic and non-Democratic countries. In particular,
Democratic countries have signiﬁcantly more persistent contractions during periods of terrorism
(conditional on starting in a contraction), and signiﬁcantly more persistent terrorism (conditional
on starting in a terrorist episode) during economic contractions. In other words, for Democratic
countries, PR(Tt|Tt−1&Et−1) < PR(Tt|Tt−1&Ct−1) and PR(Ct|Pt−1&Ct−1) < PR(Ct|Tt−1&Ct−1).
Again, these important ﬁndings for Democracies, do not hold for non-Democracies.
Combining High Income and Democratic countries together also reveals an important pat-
tern of statistically signiﬁcant relationships between economic activity and terrorist incidents. Strik-
ingly, it appears that the critical ﬁnding is that current periods of economic contractions make future
terrorist events more likely. This result can be gleaned from the following two observations. First,
periods of peace are more likely to turn to periods of terrorism if the economy is in an economic
contraction. In other words, PR(Tt|Pt−1&Ct−1) > PR(Tt|Pt−1&Et−1). Second, periods where
terrorist events take place are more likely to remain in the state of terrorism if the economic is
in an economic contraction: namely, PR(Tt|Tt−1&Ct−1) > PR(Tt|Tt−1&Et−1). Taken together,
these two ﬁndings suggest that for countries that are both high income and democratic, economic
contractions make future terrorism more likely.
In summary, the results from Table 4 are quite strong and statistically signiﬁcant. Economic
contractions and terrorist events are simply not independent events that can be considered in
isolation from one another. The strongest link between the two appears to be from economic
contractions to increased frequencies of terrorism. This link, however, is not constant across all
countries but rather is driven to a large extent by higher income and democratic governance.
Contractions make countries more likely to transition to terror and remain there. There is some
additional evidence that terrorism leads to an increase in the initiation and continuation of economic
contractions.
216 Conclusion
This paper develops a model whereby terrorist events are endogenously determined within the
model. Our main theoretical result is that an equilibrium can be sustained where groups with
limited access to opportunity may ﬁnd it rational to engage in terrorist activities while policy-
maker elites may ﬁnd it rational not to engage in opening access to these groups. The result is
then a pattern of reduced economic activity and increased terrorism.
To explore the model’s implications, we construct a rich panel data set of 130 countries from
1968 to 1991 of terrorist and economic variables. We ﬁnd a broad set of empirical ﬁndings that
economic activity and terrorism are not independent of one another. In particular, high income and
democratic countries appear to have higher incidence of terrorism, and lower incidence of economic
contraction. Furthermore, the terrorism they do observe appears to be impacted by the economic
business cycle: namely, periods of economic weakness increase the likelihood of future terrorist
activities. These results are in support of our theoretical model.
22Table 1: Terrorist Incidence Around the World
Average Annual Incidence 1968-1991
COUNTRY AVG. NO. COUNTRY AVG. NO. COUNTRY AVG. NO.
ALGERIA 0.54 GUATEMALA 6.42 PARAGUAY 0.38
ANGOLA 2.00 GUINEA 0.00 PERU 9.88
ARGENTINA 15.58 GUINEA-BISSAU 0.00 PHILIPPINES 11.00
AUSTRALIA 1.63 GUYA. 0.08 POLAND 0.58
AUSTRIA 3.29 HAITI 1.17 PORTUGAL 3.13
BAHAMAS 0.00 HONDURAS 3.38 PUERTO RICO 1.79
BAHRAIN 0.13 HONG KONG 0.50 QATAR 0.04
BANGLADESH 0.42 HUNGARY 0.33 REUNION 0.00
BARBADOS 0.21 ICELAND 0.08 ROMANIA 0.29
BELGIUM 4.33 INDIA 6.21 RWANDA 0.00
BELIZE 0.00 INDONESIA 1.42 SAUDI ARABIA 0.75
BENIN 0.00 IRAN 4.67 SENEGAL 0.08
BHUTAN 0.00 IRAQ 1.83 SEYCHELLES 0.04
BOLIVIA 3.17 IRELAND 3.38 SIERRA LEONE 0.04
BOTSWANA 0.29 ISRAEL 9.08 SINGAPORE 0.46
BRAZIL 3.00 ITALY 14.83 SOLOMON IS. 0.04
BULGARIA 0.13 IVORY COAST 0.21 SOMALIA 0.79
BURKI. FASO 0.08 JAMAICA 0.67 SOUTH AFRICA 0.92
BURUNDI 0.08 JAPAN 2.17 SPAIN 10.92
C.A.R. 0.13 JORDAN 3.29 SRI LANKA 0.75
CAMEROON 0.13 KENYA 0.33 ST.KITTS&NEVIS 0.00
CANADA 1.71 KOREA, REP. 3.04 ST.LUCIA 0.00
CAPE VERDE IS. 0.00 KUWAIT 2.00 ST.VINCENT &GRE 0.00
CHAD 0.33 LAOS 0.38 SUDAN 1.92
CHILE 5.96 LESOTHO 0.29 SURI.ME 0.25
CHINA 0.21 LIBERIA 0.58 SWAZILAND 1.13
COLOMBIA 10.17 LUXEMBOURG 0.21 SWEDEN 1.92
COMOROS 0.00 MADAGASCAR 0.00 SWITZERLAND 2.83
CONGO 0.08 MALAWI 0.04 SYRIA 1.79
COSTA RICA 2.42 MALAYSIA 2.96 TAIWAN 0.29
CYPRUS 5.21 MALI 0.00 TANZANIA 0.29
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 0.17 MALTA 0.38 THAILAND 2.08
DENMARK 1.25 MAURITANIA 0.08 TOGO 0.13
DJIBOUTI 0.33 MAURITIUS 0.00 TONGA 0.00
DOMINICA 0.04 MEXICO 3.75 TRINIDAD&TOBAGO 0.38
DOMINICAN REP. 1.08 MONGOLIA 0.00 TUNISIA 0.79
ECUADOR 1.92 MOROCCO 0.79 TURKEY 10.92
EGYPT 3.42 MOZAMBIQUE 2.71 U.K. 19.92
EL SALVADOR 7.58 MYANMAR 0.42 U.S.A. 27.63
ETHIOPIA 2.54 NAMIBIA 0.17 U.S.S.R. 1.79
FIJI 0.21 NEPAL 0.21 UGANDA 0.79
FINLAND 0.00 NETHERLANDS 6.46 UNITED ARAB E. 0.25
FRANCE 23.29 NEW ZEALAND 0.21 URUGUAY 2.00
GABON 0.17 NICARAGUA 1.29 VANUATU 0.00
GAMBIA 0.00 NIGER 0.25 VENEZUELA 2.83
GERMANY, EAST 0.33 NIGERIA 0.25 WESTERN SAMOA 0.00
GERMANY, WEST 16.00 NORWAY 0.50 YEMEN 0.50
GHANA 0.08 OMAN 0.04 YUGOSLAVIA 0.67
GRE.DA 0.04 PAKISTAN 5.25 ZAIRE 0.33
GREECE 15.21 PANAMA 1.88 ZAMBIA 0.92
PAPUA N.GUINEA 0.21 ZIMBABWE 1.79
Notes: All information in this table was obtained from ITERATE data set.
23Table 2A: Terrorist Groups in the U.S.
Average Incidence Over Each Time Period
Number Percent Name of Organization
1968- 42 17.57 Unknown
1975 29 12.13 FALN (Armed Front for National Liberation)
23 9.62 El Poder Cubano (Cuban Power)
22 9.21 Jewish Defense League
17 7.11 MIRA
10 4.18 Secret Cuban Government
9 3.77 Cuban Action Commandos
8 3.35 Indeterminate anti-Castro Cubans
7 2.93 No group involved
7 2.93 El Condor
1976- 79 23.12 Unknown
1983 60 16.71 FALN (Armed Front for National Liberation)
31 8.64 Omega-7
30 8.36 No group involved
18 5.01 Jewish Defense League
14 3.9 Indeterminate Puerto Rican groups
8 2.23 Indeterminate Serbo-Croat
8 2.23 Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide
6 1.67 Jewish Armed Resistance
5 1.39 Pedro Ruiz Botero Commandos
1984- 30 55.56 Unknown
1991 4 7.41 No group involved
4 7.41 IRA Provos
3 5.56 Jewish Defense League
3 4.29 Indeterminate Sikh extremists
2 2.86 United Freedom Fighters Federation
2 2.86 PLO
Notes: All information in this table was obtained from ITERATE data set.
24Table 2B: Terrorist Groups in France
Average Incidence Over Each Time Period
Number Percent Name of Organization
37 35.24 Unknown
1968- 7 6.67 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
1975 4 3.81 Committee of Coordination
4 3.81 Puig Antich Ulrike Meinhof Commando
3 2.86 No group involved
3 2.86 French Students
3 2.86 Charles Martel Group
3 2.86 Youth Action Group
3 2.86 GARI (International Revolutionary Action)
3 2.86 Wrath of God
1976- 73 25.61 Unknown
1983 31 10.88 Corsican National Liberation Front
12 4.21 Bakunin Gdansk Paris Group
12 4.21 Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
9 3.16 Orly Group
7 2.46 Direct Action
7 2.46 Indeterminate Armenian Nationalists
6 2.11 Organization of October 3rd
5 1.75 Ukrainian Nationalists
5 1.75 Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction
1984- 46 26.74 Unknown
1991 27 15.7 Corsican National Liberation Front
12 6.98 Committee of Solidarity with Arab prisoners
7 4.07 GAL- Anti-terrorist Liberation Group
7 4.07 ETA
7 4.07 Islamic Jihad
4 2.33 No group involved
4 2.33 Direct Action
4 2.33 Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
4 2.33 Islamic Resistance Front
Notes: All information in this table was obtained from ITERATE data set.
25Table 3: Estimates of 2 × 2 Markov Processes
for the Economy and Terrorism
EVENT X
c Economic Terrorist
Data Statistic Contraction (C) Incident (T) NOBS








PR(Xt|Xt−1) 0.465 0.600 1511







p − value 0.002 0.001
PR(Xt|Xt−1) 0.482 0.811 1503







p − value 0.002 0.001
PR(Xt|Xt−1) 0.403 0.818 1197







p − value 0.001 0.001
PR(Xt|Xt−1) 0.505 0.658 1675







p − value 0.001 0.001
Continued.
26Table 3 (continued): Estimates of 2 × 2 Markov Processes
for the Economy and Terrorism
EVENT X
Economic Terrorist
Data Statistic Contraction (E) Incident (T) NOBS
PR(Xt|Xt−1) 0.498 0.484 1111







p − value 0.001 0.001
PR(Xt|Xt−1) 0.447 0.788 1903







p − value 0.001 0.001
PR(Xt|Xt−1) 0.425 0.838 910







p − value 0.001 0.001
X refers to the events Economic Contraction (C) and Terrorist Incident (T). The
superscript c refers to the complement of an event, e.g. the complement of Con-
traction is Expansion, E = Cc, and the complement of Terrorist Incident is Peace,
P = Tc. PR(.) refers to probability, and PR(Xt|Xt−1) is the transition probability
that event X will occur in period t, given that event X occurred in period t − 1.
PR(.) is the asymptotic probability of the event and DUR(.) refers to the conditional
expected duration of an event. p − value is the p-value from a likelihood ratio test
that the estimated coeﬃcients from the transition matrix are the same in the sub-
samples and the full samples. The test is distributed χ2 with 2 degrees of freedom.
The sub-samples are for the entire data set (ALL), countries with below the median
level of initial real GDP per-capita in 1967 (LOW INCOME), and those with incomes
above the median (HIGH INCOME), fully democratic countries in 1967 (DEMOC-
RACIES), non-fully democratic countries (NON-DEMOCRACIES), African countries
(AFRICA) and non-African countries (NON-AFRICA).
27Table 4: Estimates of 4 × 4 Markov Processes for the Economy and Terrorism
LOW HIGH NON- NON- HIGH INC.
SAMPLE ALL INC. INC. DEMO DEMO AFRICA AFRICA × DEMO
PR(Tt|Pt−1&Et−1) .196 .177 .211 .209 .195 .121 .235 .206
PR(Tt|Pt−1&Ct−1) .197 .171 .252 .258 .201 .148 .272 .252
p-value [.927] [.831] [.206 ] [.347] [.271 ] [.242 ] [.228 ] [.085 ]
PR(Tt|Tt−1&Et−1) .654 .515 .718 .722 .583 .344 .708 .770
PR(Tt|Tt−1&Ct−1) .694 .577 .782 .816 .670 .515 .758 .881
p-value [.124] [.177] [.049 ] [.050] [.102 ] [.242 ] [.080 ] [.041]
PR(Ct|Pt−1&Et−1) .239 .355 .146 .213 .272 .388 .160 .148
PR(Ct|Tt−1&Et−1) .224 .305 .188 .242 .236 .381 .198 .200
p-value [.399] [.102] [.026] [.428] [.838 ] [.878 ] [.035 ] [.192 ]
PR(Ct|Pt−1&Ct−1) .497 .502 .466 .365 .463 .512 .460 .354
PR(Ct|Tt−1&Ct−1) .486 .497 .477 .495 .488 .523 .472 .462
p-value [.866] [.909] [.826] [.067] [.655 ] [.827 ] [.765 ] [.313 ]
See Table 3. P and E refer to the states of “Peace” and “Economic Expansion”, re-
spectively. Note that Peace is the complement of Terrorism, P = Tc, while Expansion
is the complement of Contraction, E = Cc. p-value, reported in square brackets, is
the test that the two preceeding probabilities are equal to one another. The test is
distributed χ2 with 1 degrees of freedom.
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